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Att t time e haft! flv vi oaa In eate Europe. 
Arr ye a Umlted fore a ar over uasian dlvblona, 
d ploy lar ly iD aat Germany, but alao in oland and waaary. 
U it b true that the &tern uropean tiona, partlc\llarly eat 
Qermaoy. bave available adclittoul men \Ill er arm• ta estern urope, 
tb lr numbers are probably off-s t by t~e !orcea lot • 
aatern uropeu aatellitea. The munerlcallmbalance as 'betw nth 
Ruaala force• an our own c mmltte tn Evape f.8 overwhelmingly 
l bt d em the aide of the "' oriet UotOD. From thla lt la clear that the 
U. • divbioaa In urope, •• auc:h, have lott real meaula in term a of 
t ahlel concept t NATO. 
Proteatatloraa to tbeo:•trary, ~b atpficant meaaia la 
aa a aymbol of our commitment to join in the 4elenae of eatern 
urope ltb aU our atren;th aad aU our wea.pona tf that area Ia lava d. 
A 01 o! tbia kine! wollld be noleaa a eymbol U the U. • commitment 
ere to conalat of two or three dlrialou rather than five. Ou would 
hope, therefore, that U ~ould be possible to offer to reduce our total 
commitment& of force& in £•rope by two or three divlaloaa in turu for 
a \ll&laa wilUn ••• to cut their forc:ee irt Huftaary, Poland and OeFmaay 
by a roua y proportionat number •• eay aomewhere l.a ex.c:••• of tea. 
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T t la be a important •tep owarda ea•l • 
urope. It alto would permit tha Kuaaian• t reduce t ir '"' am nta 
expenditur - whk t yare apparently aaxtoua t d • lt -would ermit 
'\lt to ••w a "' atandal &ll.'loun oi dollara l gold. •bleb • are DO 
dl"ailllac OQt of the cOtmtry, Ia no amaU art becauae of the num ra 
of troop• lth de ende ~. a a eg,p or in ttrw: n.re ~hie we m~Qtala 
iA E\lrope. At Lbe aamo time e removal o t '0 or three divleiona 
with all ot ita dependeau rr ighl mak it po•alble to ••• up on the flaa clal 
preta\lre and, lflence, to P• mlt he depe~del'&t• o! • o•e men ho would 
remain in urop& to atay ith th 
inally • if th uropeaoa felt their aee\Jrity eakened by • 
ltbdrawal of the Amedcar.. forcca, th y at'e ln a financial poaltlon now 
to • ren thea tbelr OVJn miUtary f'orccu, and c uld do ao. 
ln abort, a. ltd la.tiv• ln th18 eltua i ••ekln , to brln. about 
a coacurt" n .. reduction both Rua•lan and U. • to"'"c~u in \lropa 
woul 'be a rational atep to'91arda normalcy ln ur e and perae • Jt 
would be a •Eep btltn•Clttlng all the cation• f.n.volve aft(\ r flec:tln~; the 
Improved atabUlty, financially and e berwlae o! "eatern Europe. Thea• 
po••U:tiUd.e• ehoW.d 'be ., JtPlOred diplon aUcaUy tb•lr owon m dt •• 
a pan of ... llt a dh bact part o! the ov r·all major iueatl a o! •ecudty 
bt all urope . nd diaarman'Ht t. 
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At the present time we have five divisions in vvestern Europe. Array-
ed against these limited forces are over 25 Russian divisions, deployed largely 
in East Germany, but also in Foland and Hungary. Vvhile it is true that the 
Western European nations, particularly Viest Germany, have available addi-
tional men under arms in Western Europe, their numbers are probably offset 
by the forces in the Eastern European satellites. The numerical imbalance 
as between the Russian forces and our own committed in Europe is overwhelm-
ingly weighted on the side of the Soviet Union. From this it is dear that the 
U. S. divisions in Europe, as such, have lost real meaning in terms of the 
shield concept of NATO, 
Protestations to the contrary, their significant meaning is a symbol 
of our commitment to join in the defense of western Europe with all our 
strength and all our weapons if that area is invaded. A symbol of this kind 
would be no less a symbol if the U. S. commitment were to consist of two or 
three divisions rather than five. One would hope, therefore, that it would be 
possible to offer to reduce our total commitments of forces in Europe by two 
or three divisions in turn for a Russian willingness to cut their forces in Hun-
gary, Poland and Germany by a roughly proportionate number -- say somewhere 
in excess of ten. 
That would be an important step towards easing tensions in Europe. 
It also would permit the Russians to reduce their armaments expenditures -
which they are apparently anxious to do. It would permit us to save a substan-
tial amount of dollars in gold, which we are now draining out of the country, 
in no small part because of the numbers of troops with dependents and support-
ing structure which we maintain in Europe. At the same time the removal of 
two or three divisions with all of its dependents might make it possible to ease 
up on the financial pressure and, hence, to permit the dependents of those men 
who would remain in Europe to stay with them. 
Finally, if the Europeans felt their security weakened by a withdrawal 
of the American forces, they are in a financial position now to strengthen their 
own military forces, and could do so. 
In short, an initiative in this situation seeking to bring about a concur-
rent reduction of both Russian and U.S. forces in Europe would be a rational 
step towards normalcy in Europe and peace. It would be a step benefiting all 
the nations involved and reflecting the improved stability, financially and 
otherwise of v, estern Europe. These possibilities should be explored diplo-
matically on their own merit as a part of - but a distinct part of the over-all 
major questions of security in all Europe and disarmament. 
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